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with this option but partnerships are a better option if comparative advantages are 
significant. We show that the presence of moral hazard can reverse the optimal 
matching pattern relative to the first best, and that even if partnerships are optimal 
for an exogenously given pair of types, they may not be observed in equilibrium 
when matching is endogenous, suggesting that empirical studies on agency costs are 
likely to underestimate their extent by focusing on the intensive margin and 
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1 Introduction
Organizations are ways to pool and coordinate the diverse talents of diﬀerent people. When we look
at actual organizations we sometimes observe vertical relationships, e.g., a firm hiring a worker or a
landlord hiring an agricultural labourer and sometimes partnerships — sharecropping, professional
partnerships, etc. (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Levin and Tadelis, 2005). The choice of organiza-
tional structure is influenced by two important factors. On the one hand, it is shaped by incentive
considerations since more often than not people’s characteristics or actions are unobservable in
reality and need to be revealed or implemented through a constrained-optimal organizational de-
sign. On the other hand, the organizational structure depends on the relative importance of the
inputs that members bring in. By pooling various inputs organizations can exploit specialization
and comparative advantage among its members. In general, the gains from members’ comparative
advantages have to be balanced against the agency costs stemming from incentive problems.
We study the interplay of these two sets of economic forces, namely, incentive provision under
double-sided moral hazard and sorting. We are interested in what kind of contracts will be observed
in partnerships when they are voluntarily formed, and given this, what kind of partnerships will
form in equilibrium. We show that the interplay between these two economic forces makes certain
organizational forms more likely to appear than others, and this interaction explain why observed
incentive schemes are often more homogeneous relative to what incentive theory would imply.
There is also a large literature on sorting in partnerships or organizations (Becker 1973, 1993;
Sattinger, 1975; MacDonald, 1982; Rosen 1982; Kremer, 1993 among many others). The main
result is that the equilibrium sorting pattern critically depends on whether the payoﬀ function is
sub- or super-modular in agent’s characteristics. This in turn is determined to a large extent by the
complementarity or substitutability in production of those characteristics and, as we demonstrate,
the assumed information structure (first-best vs. moral hazard).
To fix ideas, consider the following example. Suppose production depends on the labor eﬀort
and the ‘talent’ (productivity) supplied by each party in a two-member organization. Agents diﬀer
in their talent. Partnerships pool talent but are subject to agency problems with regards to eﬀort
provision. To give more incentive to one party means giving less incentives to the other. If talent
and eﬀort are complements, the higher the relative ability of one agent, the higher should be his
output share. This means that he might be optimally matched with a low-ability agent. However,
this undermines the gains from trade due to specialization since a match with a high-ability person
would produce more output. Given this trade-oﬀ we show that, if the incentive costs outweigh the
gains from specialization, voluntarily formed partnerships may not be observed in equilibrium and
the high-ability agent may instead simply hire a low-ability agent from the market to work for him
or produce on his own . Thus, simply pooling talent is not a suﬃcient argument for partnerships
— strong complementarities among the quality of the supplied inputs are also needed, otherwise
with endogenous matching partnerships may not be observed. More interestingly, as we show, the
presence of double-sided moral hazard combined with weak complementarity in the inputs can lead
to a reversal of the optimal matching pattern relative to the first-best (the case with contractible
eﬀort) from positive to negative assortative matching. In contrast, without any incentive problems,
even small amount of complementarities among the quality of supplied inputs implies positive
assortative matching.
Next, we allow for endogenous matching and show that the reversal in matching patterns can
aﬀect the observed contractual forms. We demonstrate that when individuals are heterogeneous in
terms of their skills and allowing endogenous sorting, the existing results in the literature can be
significantly aﬀected. In particular, sharing the output/revenue/profit leads to the possibility of
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the abilities of the partners being strategic substitutes. Holding my partner’s ability constant, if I
am more able, optimally I should have a higher share if ability and my eﬀort are complements in
production. But this eﬀect is dampened the higher is my partner’s ability. Thus, unless our eﬀorts
(or the tasks) are highly complementary, negative sorting might end up being optimal. Therefore, in
situations where a standard model of partnerships (e.g., Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985) would predict
partnerships for an exogenously given pair of types of players, with endogenous sorting one could
instead observe one person doing both tasks (sole production) instead of the first-best partnership
arrangement since partnerships always involve some agency costs which need to be traded oﬀ relative
to the gains from comparative advantage. This has the important implication that empirical studies
on agency costs (e.g., Chiappori and Salanie, 2003 or Prendergast, 1999) are likely to underestimate
their extent by focusing on the intensive margin and ignoring the extensive margin, i.e., partnerships
that are not formed or partnerships in which the sorting pattern is reversed once endogenous
matching is allowed.1 Treating sorting patterns in organizations as exogenously given and/or
ignoring the probability of endogenously optimal re-matching can therefore lead to misleading
estimates of the welfare gains possible when resolving the problem of asymmetric information.
Our paper is also related to a recent applied literature on contracts and endogenous matching in
various settings. The issue of unobserved heterogeneity of principals and agents is now taken quite
seriously in the empirical literature on contracts (see Chiappori and Salanie, 2003 for a review).
However, it is only recently that authors have systematically tried to explore the role of matching
between principals and agents and how this aﬀects contract design. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002)
provide an argument as well as empirical evidence that, since risk-neutral tenants are likely to
select riskier crops, in equilibrium we could observe the output shares of tenants cultivating risky
crops to be higher than those of tenants cultivating less risky crops. This argument has been
formalized by Serfes (2005). Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2005) characterize the matching outcome in
a principal-agent model with risk-neutral principal and agents, moral hazard in eﬀort choice and
limited liability. They show that matching raises eﬃciency and that wealthier agents are preferred
by the principals. Besley and Ghatak (2005) consider a similar setting but allow agents to be
intrinsically motivated and principals and agents to diﬀer in terms of their ‘mission’ preferences
which aﬀects the level of agent motivation. They too show that matching raises eﬃciency, but in
their setting, it may reduce incentive pay since agent and principal mission preferences are better
aligned. Chakraborty and Citanna (2005) look at a model of occupational choice where individuals
can stay self-employed or form matches with another agent where there is a moral hazard problem
subject to limited liability. They show that less wealth-constrained individuals choose occupations
where incentive problems are more important. A recent paper by Dam (2010) analyzes a two-sided
matching problem involving entrepreneurs who vary in terms of wealth and financial intermediaries
who vary in terms of monitoring ability and shows that with endogenous matching more eﬃcient
monitors lend to borrowers with lower wealth, i.e., negative assortative matching results. Our
paper is motivated by a diﬀerent set of questions compared to this literature. We focus exclusively
on the problem of incentive problems within partnerships and two-sided matching. In contrast
to the general emphasis of this literature, in our model there are no limited-liability constraints.
Comparative advantage and not wealth are the key source of heterogeneity that we focus on.
On the theory side, Legros and Newman (2002) study matching in economies with and without
market imperfection and provide suﬃcient conditions for monotone matching that are weaker than
the standard sub- and super-modularity conditions from the earlier literature. Their results, on
which we draw upon in this paper, show examples of payoﬀ functions in imperfect markets settings
1This fits Bastiat’s dictum that an economist must take into account both what is seen and what is not seen
(Bastiat, 1873).
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where the equilibrium matching pattern is reversed (say from positive assortative to negative assor-
tative) by changing the value of an exogenous parameter. In contrast, we show that the mere fact
that a market imperfection exists (here endogenous, due to moral hazard) can lead to a reversal in
the matching pattern relative to the first-best due to the optimal endogenous choices by the agents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple two-agent model and characterizes
the optimal organizational structures that will be observed in the first best and under double-
sided moral hazard. Section 3 extends the model to allow for a varying degree of complementarity
in agents’ characteristics and more agents and types and derives the main results including the
possibility for matching pattern reversal between the first best and moral hazard under endogenous
matching. Several empirically testable implications of the model are discussed. Section 4 further
extends the analysis of the optimal sorting pattern in partnerships under double-sided moral hazard
to general functional forms for production and costs. The last section concludes.
2 A Simple Model
There is one period. A production project generates output which depend on the eﬀort levels
supplied in two distinct tasks, e1 ≥ 0 and e2 ≥ 0. There are two types of economic agents: those
who are better at task 1 and those who are better at task 2 (to be referred to as ‘task 1 specialists’
and ‘task 2 specialists’). The quality (ability, talent) of a task 1 specialist is θ1 ≥ 1 and the
quality of task 2 specialist is θ2 ≥ 1. Assume that both ability levels take values on the same set
Θ ⊆ [1,∞). In particular we could look at the case when quality takes two values — high or low,
i.e., θ1, θ2 ∈ {θl, θh} where θh > θl ≥ 1. The talent parameters, θ1, θ2 are assumed to be observable
and contractible upon. In contrast, the eﬀort levels e1 and e2 may or may not be contractible.
If a task 1 specialist of type θ1 and a task 2 specialist of type θ2 form a partnership, output is:
q(e1, e2) = θ1e1 + θ2e2 + ε
where ε is a random term with E(ε) = 0 and finite variance.
Assume that if a task j (j = 1, 2) specialist of type θj undertakes production entirely on
her own she can perform task k (k = 1, 2 with k 6= j) just as well as a task k specialist of the
lowest possible type θk = 1. This puts a natural lower bound on θ because otherwise there is
no comparative advantage for producing in a partnership. Thus, if a task 1 specialist of type θ1
undertakes production on her own (she works on both tasks), output is:
q(e1, e2) = θ1e1 + e2 + ε
Basically, she can do both tasks on her own but will do a better job in task 1 where her comparative
advantage lies. Similarly, if a task 2 specialist of type θ2 undertakes production on her own, output
is
q(e1, e2) = e1 + θ2e2 + ε.
To summarize there are three possibilities, which we illustrate with the following example. Sup-
pose one party owns a productive asset in fixed supply (e.g., land) and is good at, for instance,
supplying managerial inputs (task 1) while the other party is good at another necessary for pro-
duction task (task 2), e.g., supervision of unskilled labour. The owner of the asset could work on
both tasks although she is not very good at task 2. Alternatively, she can rent out the asset to
another person who can work on both tasks in exchange of a fixed fee. Finally, the asset owner can
form a partnership with a person who is better at the other task. Forming a partnership allows
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gains from specialization to be realized but will be subject to incentive problems when eﬀorts are
unobservable.
All parties are assumed to be risk-neutral and there are no wealth (limited liability) constraints.
Each agent has a disutility cost of providing eﬀort in either task which is assumed to be quadratic,
c(e1) = 12e
2
1 and c(e2) =
1
2e
2
2 respectively. That is, the utility/profit function of each agent is
q(e1, e2)− c(e1)− c(e2).2 The reservation payoﬀ of each agent is set to 0.
2.1 The First Best
In the first best (when e1 and e2 are contractible), under sole production by a task 1 specialist
of type θ1, we have e1 = θ1, e2 = 1 and so expected profits are 12
¡
θ21 + 1
¢
. Similarly, under sole
production by a task 2 specialist of type θ2, we have e1 = 1, e2 = θ2 and expected profits are
1
2
¡
θ22 + 1
¢
. Finally, in a partnership between a task 1 specialist of type θ1 and a task 2 specialist
of type θ2, we obtain e1 = θ1, e2 = θ2 and expected joint profits ΠFB = 12
¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢
.
This immediately implies that partnership would be chosen over sole production by task 1
specialists if and only if
1
2
¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢
≥ 1
2
¡
θ21 + 1
¢
which is always true given our assumption that θ2 ≥ 1. Analogously, a partnership will be always
chosen over sole production by task 2 specialists. Thus, in the simple setting above, when parties’
eﬀorts are contractible, partnerships will be the only organizational form observed in the economy,
for any ability levels, θ1, θ2 ≥ 1.
2.2 Double-Sided Moral Hazard
Now consider the case in which e1 and e2 are non-contractible, i.e., partnerships pool talent but
are subject to double-sided moral hazard in contrast to sole production. This implies that the
gains from specialization that can be realized in a partnership (the fact that we can have θ1 and θ2
larger than one) have to be traded-oﬀ with the agency costs occurring because of the moral hazard
problem. We restrict attention to linear contracts of the form (s,R) where s ∈ [0, 1] represents
the output share of player 1 and R represents a transfer from player 1 to player 2 (which could be
negative or positive).3 The incentive-compatibility constraints on eﬀort in a partnership imply:
e1 = argmax
e1
µ
s (θ1e1 + θ2e2)−R−
1
2
e21
¶
= sθ1
e2 = argmax
e2
µ
(1− s)(θ1e1 + θ2e2) +R−
1
2
e22
¶
= (1− s)θ2.
Joint surplus in a partnership is then
ΠMH = θe1 + θ2e2 −
1
2
e21 −
1
2
e22
= θ21
µ
s− 1
2
s2
¶
+ θ22
µ
(1− s)− 1
2
(1− s)2
¶
. (1)
2We investigate general functional forms for the output and cost functions in Section 4.
3See Bhattacharya and Lafontaine (1995) for suﬃcient conditions under which the optimal sharing rule under
double-sided moral hazard can be represented by a linear contract without loss of generality. These conditions are
satisfied in our model. Additionally, assume that there is no budget-breaker and so the first-best cannot be achieved
as in Holmstrom (1982).
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The optimal sharing rule s is chosen to maximize the joint surplus (1), that is:4
s∗ =
θ21
θ21 + θ
2
2
.
Intuitively, the optimal share, s∗ of a task 1 specialist in the partnership is higher the greater is her
ability relative to her partner’s ability. This property follows from the fact that ability and eﬀort
are complements in the production function, and so the higher is ability the greater is eﬀort for the
same share. The marginal gain from raising the share to elicit greater eﬀort therefore goes up in
ability.
Substituting s∗ in the expression for joint surplus and simplifying, we obtain
ΠMH(θ1, θ2) = θ21
θ21
2
¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢2 ¡θ21 + 2θ22¢+ θ22 θ22
2
¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢2 ¡2θ21 + θ22¢ (2)
=
1
2
(¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢
− θ
2
1θ
2
2¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢) . (3)
It is easily verified that ΠMH(θ1, θ2) is strictly sub-modular in θ1 and θ2 since
∂2ΠMH(θ1,θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2 < 0.
Note that, because of the incentive problem, the modularity of joint surplus cannot be inferred
directly from the substitutability or separability of the agents characteristics in the production
function as in the first best (e.g., as in Becker, 1973; Sattinger, 1975) but also depends on the
endogenous eﬀort choices by the parties and the optimal choice of sharing rule. For any given values
of e1 and e2, θ1 and θ2 are separable in the production function. However, since the optimal share of
each partner is equal to her ability relative to the other partner, θ1 and θ2 are no longer independent
in the joint surplus function once eﬀort levels and the share are determined endogenously. The
higher is θ1, the share of the task 1 specialist goes up while the share of the task 2 specialist goes
down, and so e1 goes up and e2 goes down. However, if θ2 is increased, then the positive eﬀect
of an increase in θ1 on the share s, and e1 (relative to e2) is dampened, and this is the intuition
for the fact that, overall, the abilities of the agents engaged in the partnership under double-sided
moral hazard are substitutes.
In contrast, if a type 1 specialist performs both tasks (i.e., output is obtained by setting θ2 = 1)
then e1 = θ1 and e2 = 1 as in the first best (there is no incentive problem in sole production) and
so
Π1(θ1) =
1
2
¡
θ21 + 1
¢
. (4)
Similarly, if a type 2 specialist performs both tasks e1 = 1, e2 = θ2 and
Π2(θ2) =
1
2
¡
θ22 + 1
¢
. (5)
3 Economic Implications
We now characterize the main implications of the model. We show that the matching patterns
between parties of diﬀerent abilities that will be observed under the first best or under double-sided
moral hazard, as well as the optimal organization forms observed in these two settings, critically
depend on whether the agents’ eﬀorts are substitutes or complements in the production function
4The same optimal sharing rule obtains if we maximize one party’s payoﬀ subject to a participation constraint by
the other.
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and also on the endogenous eﬀort choices that agents make. We show that it is possible that the
optimal matching pattern is reversed relative to the first best when eﬀorts are non-contractible.
This has important implications about the organizational forms and contractual structures that
will be observed in equilibrium under endogenous matching as well as for estimating the magnitude
of the agency costs due to moral hazard present.
We start with analyzing these eﬀects in the context of our simple model from the previous
section. Then, in Section 4, we generalize our results for wider classes of functional forms outlining
the key diﬀerences in the model implications occurring under substitutability and complementarity
of skills and eﬀorts in production.
3.1 Matching Pattern Reversal and Agency Costs
Generalize the production function from Section 2 to:
q(ei, ej) = αθizj + θiei + zjej + ε (6)
where zj = θj if production is done in a partnership and zj = 1 if the task i specialist produces
alone, for i, j = 1, 2. The parameter α ≥ 0 determines the degree of complementarity in the types
(abilities) of the partners.5 If a = 0 agents’ abilities are substitutes in production, while their
complementarity increases in a for a > 0.
Proposition 1 (First-best matching)
Suppose agents eﬀorts are contractible. Then:
(a) partnership dominates any form of sole production.
(b) only partnerships with positive assortative matching are optimal. Moreover, optimal
matches are of the ‘segregation’ type, i.e., all partnerships consist of agents of the same
ability.
Proof:
(a) Since α ≥ 0 and θi ≥ 1, the result follows directly from our discussion in Section 2.1 where
we showed that for α = 0 partnerships always (weakly) dominate sole production in the first best.
(b) The first-best expected joint payoﬀ in a partnership is ΠFB(θ1, θ2) = αθ1θ2 + θ21 + θ
2
2.
To prove the proposition statement we use the techniques of Legros and Newman (2002) which
allow us to provide a sharper characterization of the matching pattern than simply showing sub-
or super-modularity by looking at the sign of the cross-partial of joint surplus. More precisely, for
any θ1 = a, θ2 = b with a, b ∈ Θ, define the ‘surplus function’,
σFB(a, b) ≡ max{0,ΠFB(a, b)− 1
2
(ΠFB(a, a) +ΠFB(b, b))} =
= max{0, αab+ a2 + b2 − 1
2
αa2 − a2 − 1
2
αb2 − b2} =
= max{0,−α
2
(a− b)2} =
= 0 for all a, b and α ≥ 0
The proposition statement then follows directly from Proposition 4 in Legros and Newman.¥
5We rule out the case α < 0 in which higher partner’s ability reduces the joint payoﬀ. In this case, if α is suﬃciently
negative, sole production can dominate partnership and negative assortative matching occurs if partnership is optimal.
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 below.
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The intuition for Proposition 1 follows from Becker’s (1973) famous model of the marriage
market — when agents’ types are complements positive assortative matching results (e.g., Becker,
1993, ch. 4). Consider now the case in which the parties’ eﬀorts are non-contractible. From our
results in Section 2.2 we obtain:
Proposition 2 (Matching under double-sided moral hazard)
Suppose the parties’ eﬀorts are non-contractible. Conditional on partnership being the
optimal organizational form,
(a) for α ≥ 0 but not too large (i.e., α < M1 for some M1 ∈ (0, 1/2)) negative assorta-
tive matching results.
(b) for α positive and suﬃciently large, (α ≥M1) positive assortative matching (possibly
heterogeneous) results. More precisely, for any α ≥ 1/2 the optimal matching pattern
is ‘segregation’ (homogeneous partnerships).
Proof:
(a) In Section 2.2 we showed that for α = 0 joint profits are sub-modular under double-sided
moral hazard and the cross-partial ∂
2ΠMH(θ1,θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2 is strictly negative (it equals −
4θ31θ
3
2
(θ21+θ
2
2)
3 ). Since
we are simply adding α to the cross-partial here, the existence of M1 > 0 such that for α ∈
(0,M1) the cross-partial remains negative and negative matching results follows by the continuity
of ΠMH and its derivatives. To show that M1 ∈ (0, 1/2) note that 4θ
3
1θ
3
2
(θ21+θ
2
2)
3 ≤ 12 is equivalent to
(θ31 − θ32)2 + 3θ21θ22(θ1 − θ2)2 ≥ 0 which is always true. That is, for the cross-partial of ΠMH ,
α− 4θ
3
1θ
3
2
(θ21+θ
2
2)
3 to be negative, it must be that α < 1/2 hence the threshold M1 cannot exceed 1/2.
(b) By part (a) there exists an M1 > 0 for which
∂2ΠMH(θ1,θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2 ≥ 0 for α ≥ M1. Thus,
joint surplus in a partnership is super-modular and positive assortative matching results (possibly
heterogeneous). For a sharper characterization, as in the proof of Proposition 1, we follow Legros
and Newman (2002) and compute the surplus function under moral hazard (omitting the algebra):
σMH(a, b) = max{0, (a− b)2[−α
2
+
(a+ b)2
8(a2 + b2)
]}
To show the rest, note first that (a+b)
2
8(a2+b2) ≤ 1/4 is equivalent to (a− b)
2 ≥ 0 which is always true.
Thus, for α ≥ 1/2 we have (a+b)
2
8(a2+b2) ≤ 1/4 ≤
α
2 i.e. σ
MH(a, b) = 0 for any a, b ∈ Θ. By Proposition
4 in Legros and Newman (2002) the unique equilibrium matching pattern is therefore segregation.¥
Proposition 2 implies that the presence of agency costs can lead to a reversal in the equilibrium
matching pattern in partnerships. Specifically, when α > 0 so that ΠFB(θ1, θ2) is super-modular
but α is small enough so that ΠMH(θ1, θ2) is sub-modular, the presence of moral hazard not only
implies the usual loss of surplus compared to the first-best due to the agency costs, but also an
opposite pattern of sorting.
Due to the reverse endogenous sorting the true extent of agency costs is higher compared to
when matches are exogenously given. To see this, suppose we observe negative assortative matching
in a partnership under double-sided moral hazard and would like to assess the welfare loss due to
agency costs relative to the first-best outcome. If we took this partnership as exogenously given,
resolving the moral hazard problem would indicate a smaller increase in welfare compared to the
true magnitude of welfare gains that will be obtained when parties are allowed to endogenously re-
match in a positive assortative pattern (as they optimally would in the first best). Treating sorting
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patterns in organizations as exogenously given and/or ignoring the probability of endogenously
optimal re-matching can therefore lead to misleading estimates of the welfare gains possible when
resolving asymmetric information or other causes of market imperfections.
3.2 Optimal Contractual Forms with Endogenous Matching
3.2.1 Sub-Modular Joint Surplus
We now concentrate on the case of non-contractible eﬀorts since otherwise (as shown in Section
3.1) partnership are the only organizational form that will be observed. Suppose the production
function is such that negative assortative matching is optimal in a partnership. In particular, take
our setting from Section 3.1 with α = 0 (the results below are easily generalizable for α positive
and suﬃciently small, the case α ∈ (0,M1) from Proposition 2). We characterize the case of more
general production functions in Section 4. Also, assume initially that each agent’s abilities can take
only two values, θl and θh.
For the sake of concreteness, think of the setting studied by Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) where
Agent 1 (the productive asset owner) is a landowner who has comparative advantage in managerial
inputs (e.g., making production decisions based on market information and technical know-how) and
Agent 2, who has no land, is a tenant who has comparative advantage in labour supervision. Both
parties’ eﬀorts are not easily verifiable which leads to a double-sided moral hazard problem. Given
that, both parties need to be given incentives to provide their inputs which is precisely what a share
contract does. There are three possible forms of production: (i) the agents form a partnership and
produce together subject to the double-sided moral hazard problem (‘sharecropping’); (ii) Agent 1
is the sole producer paying unskilled workers a fixed wage; and (iii) Agent 2 is the sole producer
paying Agent 1 a fixed rent. Since output is increasing in θ, in the latter two cases it is the higher
productivity agent who is the sole producer, i.e., a necessary condition for the ‘fixed wage’ scenario
to occur is θ1 > θ2, while the ‘fixed rent’ scenario occurs if θ2 > θ1.
While retaining some key elements of the Eswaran-Kotwal model, we relax two of their assump-
tions. First, we generalize their analysis for more general production functions and show how this
aﬀects the optimal choice of organizational form. Second, more importantly, we allow for many
players with diﬀerent degrees of absolute advantage in the two tasks (including many of the same
type) who are free to choose any partner. In contrast, Eswaran and Kotwal consider only two,
exogenously given agents, each with an absolute advantage in performing one of the tasks.
A straightforward comparison of (4) and (5) implies the following result: Π1 R Π2 according as
θ1 R θ2. Furthermore, a partnership would be chosen if and only if
1
2
(¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢
− θ
2θ22¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢) ≥ max½1
2
¡
θ21 + 1
¢
,
1
2
¡
θ22 + 1
¢¾
Suppose we have a same-skill exogenously given match, i.e., θ1 = θ2 = θ (where θ is θl or θh). From
the above result, a partnership would be chosen if and only if
1
2
½
2θ2 − θ
2θ2
2θ2
¾
≥ 1
2
¡
θ2 + 1
¢
or,
θ2 ≥ 2 (7)
Note that this condition is stronger than the corresponding condition for the first best (θ ≥ 1)
derived in Section 2.1.
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If condition (7) is satisfied by both θl and θh and (this is crucial) if the above homogeneous
matches were given exogenously, we would conclude that partnerships would be the only organiza-
tional form observed in this economy. For example, if there were only two agents in the economy
(either both type θl or both type θh) or if we think of these homogeneous pairs of agents as living
in two separate villages, we would expect to observe only partnerships (and no sole production)
in each location. By taking pairs of agents in isolation (as, for instance, Eswaran and Kotwal
do) and inferring which contract form they would choose we, however, ignore the possibility that
endogenous sorting may cause such a pair of agents to never actually match in equilibrium.
Consider the following example which makes the latter point clearer. Suppose there are two
agents of each type θl and θh, i.e., four individuals in total. If each agent is allowed to match with
any partner they want to, out of the three available, we can show that partnerships may actually
not be observed in equilibrium although they would be if the pairs (θl, θl) or (θh, θh) with θ2l , θ
2
h ≥ 2
were studied in isolation. This is due to the fact that joint surplus in a partnership under double-
sided moral hazard is sub-modular in the quality of the agents engaged in the two tasks under the
assumed parameters in this sub-section (see Proposition 2, part (a)).
The sub-modularity of joint surplus implies that if partnerships are optimal they must take
the form (θh, θl). Therefore, with endogenous matching it is no longer the case that partnership
dominates the alternative organization forms for any θl and θh satisfying (7). Indeed, with negative
assortative matching, sole production by the high type would dominate partnership if
1
2
(¡
θ2h + θ
2
l
¢
− θ
2
hθ
2
l¡
θ2h + θ
2
l
¢) < 1
2
¡
θ2h + 1
¢
or, equivalently, if
θ2h > θ
4
l − θ2l (8)
For instance, condition (8) always holds for θ2l = 2 and hence with endogenous matching we would
not observe partnerships in an economy with double-sided moral hazard and α ∈ [0,M1).
More generally, the (θ1, θ2) parameter space can be divided into three areas depicted on Fig. 1
below.
A1. ‘fixed wage’ area corresponding to the set {(θ1, θ2) : θ1 ≥ θ2 and θ21 > θ42 − θ22}
A2. ‘fixed rental’ area corresponding to the set {(θ1, θ2) : θ2 ≥ θ1 and θ22 > θ41 − θ21}
A3. ‘partnership’ area corresponding to the set {(θ1, θ2) : θ1 ≥ θ2 and θ21 ≤ θ42 − θ22} ∪
{(θ1, θ2) : θ2 ≥ θ1 and θ22 ≤ θ41 − θ21}
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Note that partnerships would occur only when both agents have relatively high and not too
dissimilar productivities (similar to Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985). However, unlike in Eswaran and
Kotwal, our analysis implies that models of partnerships that ignore endogenous matching could
predict partnerships to be optimal for parameter values for which they may not be optimal in many
realistic situations where free partner choice is possible. For example, look at Fig. 1 and suppose
we take two agents in isolation at either point A (both with high θ) or point C (both with low θ).
Since θ2 > 2 at both points A and C we would conclude that partnerships between them will be
observed. If we consider, however, an economy with the four agents together and they are allowed
to match endogenously, the total surplus in two heterogeneous partnerships (which are optimal
when ΠMH is sub-modular) is higher than that of the two homogeneous partnerships. However, for
the thetas corresponding to points A and C on the figure, heterogeneous partnerships corresponding
to the points B and D on the graph are dominated by contractual forms in which the high-skilled
agent is a sole producer. This implies that no partnerships would be observed in this economy with
endogenous matching.
Contrast the above scenario with another in which we instead start with two isolated agents at
either points E and G (i.e., when the diversity in skills between the high and low type is not so
large). Under matching in isolation (or, exogenously given pairs) we would observe partnerships.
Unlike in the previous example, with all agents together and free to match with anyone they like
we now observe partnerships corresponding to points H and F. Notice, however, that the matching
pattern is reversed under endogenous sorting.
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Clearly, the same intuition generalizes for the case of diﬀerent skill levels. For example, the
initial points A or C may be oﬀ the 45-degree line, i.e., we can have skill level combinations
((θA1 )2, (θ
A
2 )
2) and ((θC1 )2, (θ
C
2 )
2) with θAi > θ
C
i . As long as A and C are inside the triangular
shaped area labeled “partnership” on Fig. 1 while the corresponding points B and D obtained by
permuting their coordinates (i.e., ((θA1 )2, (θ
C
2 )
2) and ((θC1 )2, (θ
A
2 )
2) are outside this area, we obtain
the same results. Introducing more players also does not change the main intuition.
The above results imply that under double-sided moral hazard and endogenous matching part-
nerships will be only observed if the agents’ skills are relatively close to each other. Moreover,
the smaller the values that θ2h and θ
2
l take, the smaller the diﬀerence between the two must be to
observe partnerships in equilibrium. Remember that for the production function (6) the optimal
share in a partnership is
θ2h
θ2h+θ
2
l
. Thus, (as in Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985) the optimal share when
a partnership is actually observed would be close to 1/2.
Note that the endogenous matching makes the dispersion in ability values for which partnerships
would be observed narrower than if the pairings were exogenously given (see Fig. 1, points H and
F) and so the corresponding optimal share is closer to 1/2. Another prediction of our model is that
the lower the levels of θh and θl are, the lower the dispersion of observed shares around 1/2 would
be. For example, it is clear that if θ2l = 2, partnerships can only be observed if θh = θl and the
share will be exactly 1/2. More generally, if θ2l > 2 but close to 2 partnerships will be observed
only if the ability diﬀerence between the two partners, θh − θl is suﬃciently small and the optimal
sharing rule will be close to 1/2.
These results also generalize for multiple skill levels. Suppose, for example, the squares of the
two task qualities are drawn from the continuous symmetric distribution6 φ(θ2) with support on
the interval (θ2m −∆, θ2m +∆) where θ2m −∆ ≥ 2. The above discussion then implies that, under
endogenous matching, the locus of all partnerships which would be observed in equilibrium must lie
on the segment AB of the line through point C with coordinates (θ2m, θ
2
m) depicted on Fig. 2 below.
Clearly, the lower θm is, the ‘harder’ will be to observe partnerships. Holding θm fixed, partnerships
will be observed only between agents of skills relatively close to θm (which would be the mean skill
level if φ is uniform). In particular, the most heterogeneous partnership (corresponding to points
A and B on Fig. 2) can be between agents with skills
q
θ2m − δ and
q
θ2m + δ where δ solves7:
θ2m + δ = (θ
2
m − δ)2 − (θ2m − δ)
i.e., for δ = θ2m −
√
2θm.
For example, if φ is uniform and θ2m = 3 (mean skill of 1.73), the most heterogeneous partnership
that will be observed in equilibrium is between agents with skills 1.57 and 1.88 and it features an
optimal share of 0.59. That is, there would be no partnerships observed in this economy with shares
outside the interval (0.41,0.59).
6Everything said here applies also to the asymmetric abilities case which however is harder to depict graphically.
7This is simply the equation of the curved line through point B.
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3.2.2 Super-modular Joint Surplus
The results in Section 3.2.1 use crucially the fact that when ΠMH is sub-modular the optimal
matching pattern under double-sided moral hazard is negative. Suppose instead that ΠMH is
super-modular (e.g., α > 0 and high enough — Proposition 2, part (b)), so that positive assortative
matching would optimally occur. Now the argument from the sub-modular case goes the other
way. Namely, if we start with heterogeneous agent pairs corresponding to the points B or D on Fig.
1 in isolation, we would conclude that no partnerships will be observed in the economy. However,
with endogenous matching allowed, the homogeneous partnerships corresponding to points A and
C will arise in equilibrium.
More generally, compared to the sub-modular case, positive assortative matching will lead to
partnerships between agents with close skill levels, i.e., the observed optimal shares will be even
closer to 1/2 on average, holding other things equal. For example, in the continuous skill distribution
setting described in Section 3.2.1 with endogenous matching we would observe only partnerships
between agents of equal skill (‘segregation’) and hence shares of 1/2 in each of them. No other
sharing rules would be observed in equilibrium. In addition, as long as θ2m−∆ ≥ 2 all agents in the
economy would form partnerships, no matter what the values of the mean skill θ2m or the support
range ∆ are, unlike in the sub-modular case.
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3.3 Discussion and Testable Implications
We now derive and discuss some economic applications and testable implications which follow from
our theoretical analysis.
1. Within vs. between group heterogeneity
Suppose that negative sorting is observed in equilibrium under double-sided moral hazard (e.g.,
the case α = 0). This means there is more heterogeneity within groups (partnerships), but less
heterogeneity across groups. In our simple two-type (θl, θh) example, the joint surplus of both
groups is the same. While we do not determine the exact individual payoﬀs, we showed that the
optimal output shares within a heterogeneous partnership are unequal. If instead we observed
positive sorting, there is little intra-group inequality (zero in the simple two-type setting where
both tasks are equally important), but considerable inter-group inequality. The endogenous sorting
pattern can thus have significant implications about inequality in the economy as a whole.
2. Unobserved ability
Negative sorting implies that partnerships will be heterogeneous. If ability is not directly
measured but instead proxied (e.g., by wealth) such heterogeneity is often interpreted as suggestive
for risk-sharing — the relatively less risk-averse (e.g., richer) partner insures the more risk-averse
(e.g., poorer) partner. We provide an alternative explanation for heterogeneous partnerships which
does not rely on risk aversion and insurance motives.
3. Variance of observed optimal shares
A testable prediction of our theory is that, holding other things equal, the observed distribution
of shares in the population would have greater variance under negative sorting than under positive
sorting. However, one needs to be mindful of the fact that diﬀerent sets of partnerships would be
observed depending on the optimal sorting pattern.
4. Variance of output
If we measure the output of partnerships under double-sided moral hazard (ignoring the cost
of eﬀort) it is easy to verify that it equals:
αθ1θ2 +
¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢
− 2θ
2
1θ
2
2¡
θ21 + θ
2
2
¢
Hence, if α = 0 or positive but not too high output is sub-modular in θ1 and θ2 as well. This has
the implication that the variance of output across partnerships will be less with negative sorting
compared to the case with positive sorting.
5. Skewness of the income distribution
With positive sorting Kremer (1993) shows that the income distribution is skewed to the right.
His model has no agency problems, just a production function depending on the product of skills,
y = Aθ1θ2 which leads to completely homogeneous groups (θ1 = θ2) being formed. Kremer shows
that if the skill gap between two agents is θh−θl > 0 this translates into an income gap proportional
to θ2h − θ2l since the competitive market wage is proportional to the square of one’s skill given the
homogeneous matching. Since xn is a convex function for n > 1, if x3 − x2 = x1 − x0 where
x3 > x1 then by convexity (x3)
n − (x2)n > (x1)n − (x0)n . Hence, with positive sorting the income
distribution in Kremer’s model economy is more skewed than the skill distribution.
Similar logic applies in our setting. Suppose both parties’ skills are drawn from the same
distribution. Under positive sorting there will be homogeneous matching and total profits are:
ΠMHpos ≡ 34θ
2. Since the optimal share is 1/2, each partner earns income of 38θ
2 which, as in Kremer’s
model, is proportional to the square of her skill level.
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Constraining ourselves to partnerships, we can show that the income distribution is even more
skewed than the skill distribution under negative sorting compared to under positive sorting. For
simplicity consider the case with only two skill levels for each task, θh > θl > 2. From above we
know that heterogeneous partnerships will arise in equilibrium and each will make joint profits of
ΠMHneg ≡ 12
n
θ2h + θ
2
l −
θ2hθ
2
l
θ2h+θ
2
l
o
. The optimal share is s∗ = θ
2
h
θ2h+θ
2
l
, so the high-skill partner earns
expected income of s∗ΠMHneg while the low skilled one earns an income of (1− s∗)ΠMHneg . Therefore,
the diﬀerence in the incomes of the high- and low-skill partners is:
(2s∗ − 1)ΠMHneg =
1
2
(θ2h − θ2l )[1−
θ2hθ
2
l
(θ2h + θ
2
l )
2
] >
3
8
(θ2h − θ2l )
since
θ2hθ
2
l
(θ2h+θ
2
l )
2 <
1
4 . Thus, the income distribution among agents who form partnerships under both
positive and negative sorting will be more skewed under negative sorting. The intuition is that the
optimal share now also biases income in favor of the high-skill agent — incentive reasons dictate that
he earns a higher share of total profits, which enhances the rewards to skill in addition to what is
coming solely from technology. The reversal in the matching pattern from positive to negative due
to the presence of moral hazard shown in the previous section thus exacerbates income inequality
in our model economy above and beyond the technological complementarity reasons identified by
Kremer. Depending on the social welfare function one may wish to adopt this may add to the
agency costs due to asymmetric information or eﬀort non-contractibility.
4 General Functional Forms
We now investigate in more detail the conditions on the production and eﬀort cost functions that
lead to sub- or super- modularity of the joint surplus function under double-sided moral hazard and
endogenous matching. Since the payoﬀ function is implicitly defined by the endogenous eﬀort and
share choices, we first need to characterize the optimal eﬀorts and share that arise in a partnership.
In particular, with general functional forms we cannot use directly the conditions of Legros and
Newman (2002) to verify whether positive or negative assortative matching will occur since it is
hard to verify them for the endogenously defined surplus function. Instead, we use the implicit
function theorem and rely on the cross-derivative sign to characterize the conditions for sub- or
super-modularity of joint payoﬀs directly.
The optimal sorting literature (e.g. Becker, 1993, Sattinger, 1975) has argued that the sub-
or super-modularity of the payoﬀ function is closely related to whether the agents’ characteristics
over which matching is done are substitutes or complements. With substitutes negative assortative
matching occurs while with complements there is positive assortative matching. As pointed out in
Legros and Newman (2002) the link between the degree of substitutability of agents’ characteristics
and the modularity of the payoﬀ function may break down in more general environments featuring
credit market imperfections (Legros and Newman, 1996; Sadoulet, 1998), restrictions on how out-
put is shared (Farrell and Scotchmer, 1998), or specific output technologies (Kremer and Maskin,
1996). Given our double-sided moral hazard environment, it is thus necessary to derive the precise
conditions under which joint profits are sub- or super-modular. The connection between substi-
tutability in skills (over which agents match) and the modularity of joint profits is not immediate
due to the endogenous choice of eﬀort levels and the optimal sharing rule for output. We show
that modularity is still related to the degree of substitutability in agents’ skills but the degree of
substitutability in eﬀorts plays an additional important role.
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We first look at two general classes of production functions — one where agents’ eﬀorts and
skills are substitutes in production and one in which they are complements. We then study several
particular widely-used functional forms.
4.1 Substitutes
Assume that the joint payoﬀ function takes the following form in which the two partners’ inputs
and skill levels are substitutes in production:
Π(e1, e2, θ1, θ2) = F (e1, θ1) + F (e2, θ2)− c(e1)− c(e2) + ε,
and where the functions F and c satisfy:
Assumption S: F1 > 0, F11 < 0, c is increasing and convex and c0F111 − c000F1 ≤ 0.
Among standard requirements on the production and cost functions, Assumption S requires that
c0 is convex enough relative to F (which can be concave as shown in the Cobb-Douglas example
later in the paper). Let e∗1, e
∗
2 denote the first-best eﬀort levels of the two partners and eˆ1, eˆ2 their
eﬀort levels under double-sided moral hazard.
Proposition 3
(a) In the first best (contractible eﬀorts):
∂2Π(e∗1, e
∗
2, θ1, θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2
= 0, i.e. joint surplus is
both sub- and super-modular in θ1, θ2.
(b) Under double-sided moral hazard and endogenous matching
∂2Π(eˆ1, eˆ2, θ1, θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2
< 0,
i.e., joint surplus is sub-modular in θ1, θ2.
Proof: (see Appendix)
Proposition 3 is basically a generalization of the case α = 0 from our simple model in Section 2.
The first-best joint surplus in a partnership is weakly super-modular while the joint surplus under
double-sided moral hazard is sub-modular. The corresponding discussion in Section 3 applies.
The following corollary extends Proposition 3 to allow for direct complementarity between
agents’ skills (but not between their eﬀorts). The proof follows directly from the proof of Proposition
3 and is hence omitted.
Corollary 1 to Proposition 3
Suppose the joint payoﬀ function is given by
Π(e1, e2, θ1, θ2) = f(θ1, θ2) + F (e1, θ1) + F (e2, θ2)− c(e1)− c(e2)
where ∂
2f(θ1,θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2 > 0. Then:
(a) In the first best
∂2Π(e∗1,e
∗
2,θ1,θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2
> 0, i.e. joint surplus is super-modular in the skill
levels θ1, θ2.
(b) Under double-sided moral hazard and endogenous matching the sign of ∂
2Π(eˆ1,eˆ2,θ1,θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2
depends on the magnitude of ∂
2f(θ1,θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2 , and if the latter is small enough joint surplus
is sub-modular in θ1, θ2.
The Corollary results are a generalization of the case α > 0 in Section 3.1 and Proposition 2.
Again, the corresponding discussion from Section 3 applies.
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4.2 Complements
Next, we analyze the case in which the agents’ skills and eﬀorts are complements. Specifically, let
the joint payoﬀ function be
Π(e1, e2, θ1, θ2) = F (θ1, θ2)G(e1, e2)− c(e1)− c(e2)
and suppose the following assumption holds:
Assumption C: F is symmetric and increasing in both arguments, G is symmetric
and increasing in both arguments, G11,G22 ≤ 0, G12 ≥ 0 and G11G22 −G212 ≥ 0
Note that this case assumes complementarity between agents’ skills, between agents’ eﬀorts,
and between skills and eﬀorts. Also note that the conditions on the partial derivatives of G are
satisfied for any Cobb-Douglas function with exponents less than one.
Proposition 4
(a) In the first best (contractible eﬀorts):
∂2Π(e∗1, e
∗
2, θ1, θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2
> 0, i.e. joint surplus is
super-modular in θ1, θ2.
(b) Under double-sided moral hazard and endogenous matching:
∂2Π(eˆ1, eˆ2, θ1, θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2
> 0,
i.e. joint surplus is also super-modular in θ1, θ2.
Proof: (see Appendix)
Proposition 4 extends our previous analysis to allow for complementarity in agents’ eﬀorts. The
result is that homogeneous partnerships result independently of whether eﬀort is contractible or
not. Intuitively, the complementarities in both eﬀorts and skills work in the same direction to make
high-skill agents optimally match with other high-skilled agents, as in Kremer’s (1993) model.
4.3 Special Cases of Production Functions
We now look at some specific, widely-used functional forms as we continue to investigate the
modularity of joint surplus with respect to the agents’ skill levels and hence the optimal matching
pattern that will be observed in partnerships. Depending on whether skills are sub- or super-
modular in the indirect joint surplus function ΠMH(θ1, θ2), the respective discussion and conclusions
from Section 3 apply.
4.3.1 Perfect Complements
Suppose output is given by a Leontief / perfect-complements production function in the ability-
augmented eﬀorts of the two partners:8
q(e1, e2) = min{θ1e1, θ2e2}+ ε.
We first show that at the optimum it must be the case that θ1e1 = θ2e2. Suppose not, e.g., for
example, 0 < θ1e1 < θ2e2. Then the expected joint surplus maximization objective would be
8Note that we analyzed the corresponding ‘perfect substitutes’ in θiei case in Section 2.
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θ1e1 − e
2
1
2 −
e22
2 and it is clearly optimal to set e2 = 0, that is θ2e2 would be smaller than θ1e1 —
contradiction. Therefore, we must have,
θ1e∗1 = θ2e
∗
2 (9)
From the FOCs we obtain:
e∗1 = sθ1 and e
∗
2 = (1− s)θ2 (10)
Equations (9) and (10) imply that the optimal share is equal to:
s∗ =
θ22
θ21 + θ
2
2
(11)
Note that the above expression for s∗ is the ‘opposite’ of that in the perfect substitutes case derived
in Section 2.2. Given the expressions for s∗, e∗1 and e
∗
2, joint surplus at the optimum equals:
ΠMH =
1
2
θ21θ
2
2
θ21 + θ
2
2
It is clear upon inspection that ΠMH is super-modular in θ1 and θ2. Moreover, it is easy to verify
that the ‘surplus function’ (Legros and Newman, 2002) is identically equal to zero for any θ1, θ2 ≥ 1
and thus only homogeneous partnerships will be observed in equilibrium under double-sided moral
hazard and endogenous matching.
4.3.2 Cobb-Douglas Substitutes
Suppose joint payoﬀs are given by
Π = θ1
eα1
α
+ θ2
eα2
α
− e
β
1
β
− e
β
2
β
+ ε
where α ∈ (0, 1) and β > 1. This surplus function belongs to the general class studied in Section 4.1
but here we do not necessarily impose the suﬃcient conditions in Assumption S. From the general
analysis above it is clear what happens in the first best, so let us focus on the second best. The
FOCs are:
sθ1αeα−11 = e
β−1
1
(1− s)θ2αeα−12 = e
β−1
2
i.e.,
eˆ1 = (sθ1)γ and eˆ2 = ((1− s)θ2)γ
where γ ≡ 1β−α . Plugging in and diﬀerentiating we obtain:
∂Πˆ
∂s
= γθαγ1 s
αγ−1[1− s]− γθαγ2 (1− s)αγ−1s
Setting the above derivative to zero we have:
s∗
1− s∗ = (
θ2
θ1
)
αγ
αγ−2
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Clearly then, ∂s
∗
∂θ1 and
∂s∗
∂θ2 must have opposite signs. Assume that α <
β
2 (for example, β > 2 is
suﬃcient) which implies
α
β − α = αγ < 1 (12)
Now look at the functionG(a, b) from the Proof of Proposition 3 in Section 4.1. In the Cobb-Douglas
case we have:
G11(a, b) = γbαγ [(αγ − 1)aαγ−2(1− a)− aαγ−1] < 0
given (12). This inequality, together with the opposite signs of ∂s
∗
∂θ1 and
∂s∗
∂θ2 is enough to guarantee
the negativity of the cross partial of ΠMH as shown in Proposition 3. Thus, if β > 2α the optimal
sorting pattern is negative and heterogeneous partnerships are optimal.
To clarify the restrictions under which Proposition 3 holds, we analyze what Assumption S
implies for the parameters α and β in the Cobb-Douglas case. Using the notation from Section
4.1, we have c0 = eˆβ−1, F 000 = (α− 1)(α− 2)eˆα−3, c000 = (β − 1)(β − 2)eˆβ−3, F 0 = eˆα−1. Thus, the
inequality involving the derivatives of c and F in Assumption S is equivalent to:
3(β − α) ≤ (β − α)(β + α)
Since β > α, the above inequality holds whenever α+β > 3, i.e., when c is convex enough (relative
to the concavity of F ). Note that this is stronger than the condition β > 2α in (12) but not
excessively restrictive.
4.3.3 CES Production Function
In our analysis above we saw that, depending on whether the eﬀorts and/or abilities of the two
agents are substitutes vs. complements, joint surplus can be sub- or super-modular in the agents’
abilities, θ1 and θ2. A natural way to combine and extend the results from the perfect substitutes
and perfect complements is to look at a production function of the CES type:
q(e1, e2) = (θ1e
ρ
1 + θ2e
ρ
2)
1
ρ
When ρ→ 1 expected output becomes θ1e1+θ2e2, i.e., perfect substitutes in ability-augmented ef-
forts (our benchmark case from Section 2) while when ρ→ −∞ expected output equals min{θ1e1, θ2e2}
— the perfect complements case from Section 4.3.1.
By a standard continuity argument our previous results imply that for high values of ρ, the CES
function leads to super-modularity of joint surplus under moral hazard, ΠMH , while for lower ρ joint
surplus will be sub-modular. It is hard to analyze analytically the intermediate case ρ 6= 1,−∞, thus
we compute numerically the cross-partial derivative of joint surplus ∂
2ΠMH(θ1,θ2)
∂θ1∂θ2 as a function of ρ.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the existence of a cutoﬀ level for ρ so that the cross-partial is strictly positive
for ρ lower than the threshold and strictly negative for ρ higher than the threshold. This result is
shown for both equal or diﬀerent ability values for the two agents. The main implication is that for
suﬃciently high degree of complementarity between the inputs in production positive assortative
matching is always optimal, whereas for production functions characterized by relatively low input
complementarity negative assortative matching provides higher joint surplus under double-sided
moral hazard and endogenous matching.
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Fig. 3 − CES Case. Cross−Derivative of Joint Surplus
5 Conclusions
We analyzed partnerships between risk-neutral parties that are subject to double-sided moral haz-
ard. We contribute to the emerging literature in theory of contracts and organizations that looks
at endogenous matching of the contracting parties by looking at the case of partnerships. We
allow agents to be able to freely to choose any partner. We present two main results. First, the
presence of moral hazard can reverse the optimal matching pattern in organizations relative to the
first-best. Second, even if partnerships are optimal for an exogenously given pair of types we show
that if matching is endogenous they may not be observed in equilibrium and so any measure of
agency costs based on partnerships that exist are likely to underestimate the true extent of agency
costs due to double-sided moral hazard, because of partnerships that will not form relative to the
first-best.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
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(a) The first-best eﬀorts solve:
F1(e1, θ1) = c0(e1)
F1(e2, θ2) = c0(e2)
Let the solutions to the above system be denoted by e∗1 = e
∗(θ1) and e∗2 = e
∗(θ2). Plugging back
into the expression for Π we have:
∂2Π∗
∂θ1∂θ2
= 0 (13)
due to the assumed separability of the function Π.
(b) Now assume that agents’ eﬀorts are unobservable, i.e., there is a double-sided moral hazard
problem. The FOCs are:
sF1(e1, θ1) = c0(e1) (14)
(1− s)F1(e2, θ2) = c0(e2) (15)
Denote the solutions to the above equations by eˆi = eˆ(a, b) where a is s or 1− s and b is θ1 or θ2
respectively for i = 1, 2. We start by deriving some useful properties of eˆ. Diﬀerentiating (14) and
(15) with respect to a we have:
F1 + aF11
∂eˆ
∂a
= c00
∂eˆ
∂a
(16)
i.e.,
∂eˆ
∂a
=
F1
c00 − aF11
> 0
by Assumption S. Diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to a we obtain:
F11
∂eˆ
∂a
+ F11
∂eˆ
∂a
+ a[F111(
∂eˆ
∂a
)2 + F11
∂2eˆ
∂a2
] = c000(
∂eˆ
∂a
)2 + c00
∂2eˆ
∂a2
i.e.,
∂2eˆ
∂a2
=
[2F11 + (aF111 − c000)
∂eˆ
∂a
]
∂eˆ
∂a
c00 − aF11
< 0
by Assumption S and by the fact that c0 = aF 0 from the FOCs.
Denote by Πˆ(s) the joint surplus under double-sided moral hazard, i.e.,
Πˆ(s) = F (eˆ(s, θ1), θ1) + F (eˆ(1− s, θ2))− c(eˆ(s, θ1))− c(eˆ(1− s, θ2)) =
≡ G1(s, θ1) +G2(1− s, θ2)
where G(a, b) ≡ F (eˆ(a, b), b)− c(eˆ(a, b)). We proceed to derive some properties of the function G.
Note first that,
G1 = [F1 − c0]
∂eˆ
∂a
> 0 (17)
using the FOCs and the properties of eˆ derived above. Similarly, diﬀerentiating once more in a we
have,
G11 = F11(
∂eˆ
∂a
)2 + [F1 − c0]
∂2eˆ
∂a2
− c00(∂eˆ
∂a
)2 < 0. (18)
Let s∗(θ1, θ2) be the share which maximizes Πˆ(s). It must solve:
G1(s∗, θ1)−G1(1− s∗, θ2) = 0 (19)
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Diﬀerentiating with respect to θ1 we get:
G11(s∗, θ1)
∂s∗
∂θ1
+G12(s∗, θ2) +G11(1− s∗, θ2)
∂s∗
∂θ1
= 0 (20)
By the envelope theorem,
∂Πˆ(s∗)
∂θ1
= G2(s∗, θ1)
and therefore
∂2Πˆ(s∗)
∂θ1∂θ2
= G21(s∗, θ1)
∂s∗
∂θ2
= −[G11(s∗, θ1) +G11(1− s∗, θ2)]
∂s∗
∂θ1
∂s∗
∂θ2
< 0
where we have used the expression for G21(s∗, θ1) from (20). The sign of the above cross-partial
derivative is negative by (18) and by the fact that
∂s∗
∂θ1
and
∂s∗
∂θ2
must have diﬀerent signs at an
interior optimum.¥
Proof of Proposition 4
(a) The first-best eﬀorts solve:
FG1(e1, e2) = c0(e1)
FG2(e1, e2) = c0(e2)
where F ≡ F (θ1, θ2) to save on notation. Denote the optimal eﬀort levels by e∗1(F ) and e∗2(F ).
Diﬀerentiating the above FOCs with respect to F yields:
G1(e∗1, e
∗
2) + FG11
∂e∗1
∂F
+ FG12
∂e∗2
∂F
= c00(e∗1)
∂e∗1
∂F
G2(e∗1, e
∗
2) + FG21
∂e∗1
∂F
+ FG22
∂e∗2
∂F
= c00(e∗2)
∂e∗2
∂F
This is a linear system in
∂e∗1
∂F and
∂e∗2
∂F . Its solutions can be obtained by Cramer’s rule:
∂e∗1
∂F
=
¯¯¯¯
G1 −FG12
G2 c00(e∗1)− FG22
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
c00(e∗1)− FG11 −FG12
−FG12 c00(e∗2)− FG22
¯¯¯¯
and similarly for
∂e∗2
∂F , where |A| denotes the determinant of the matrix A. Notice that both the
numerator and denominator are non-negative by our assumptions. Thus
∂e∗1
∂F and
∂e∗2
∂F are non-
negative. Plugging back into Π and using the envelope theorem we have:
∂Π∗
∂θ1
= F1G
and thus
∂2Π∗
∂θ1∂θ2
= F12G+ F1[G1
∂e∗1
∂F
F2 +G2
∂e∗2
∂F
F2] > 0
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(b) Now suppose agents’ eﬀorts are unobservable. The FOCs become:
sFG1(e1, e2) = c0(e1) (21)
(1− s)FG2(e1, e2) = c0(e2) (22)
Denote the solutions to the above system by eˆ1 = eˆ(s, F ) and eˆ2 = eˆ(1 − s, F ). Proceeding as in
part (a), we have,
∂eˆ1
∂F
=
¯¯¯¯
sG1 −sFG12
(1− s)G2 c00(eˆ1)− (1− s)FG22
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
c00(eˆ1)− sFG11 −sFG12
−(1− s)FG12 c00(eˆ2)− (1− s)FG22
¯¯¯¯
which is once again positive by our assumptions on G. The same holds for ∂eˆ2∂F .
It is crucial to note that, because of the assumed symmetry, the optimal share sˆ cannot depend
on F . Suppose this is not true, e.g., sˆ is increasing in F . But then, since the production function is
completely symmetric across the two agents, it must be that 1− s is also increasing in F which is a
contradiction. This implies that F aﬀects the optimal eﬀort choices only directly and not through
s, i.e., ∂s
∗
∂F = 0. Given the latter, we have:
∂2Πˆ
∂θ1∂θ2
= F12G+ F1[G1
∂eˆ1
∂F
F2 +G2
∂eˆ2
∂F
F2] > 0
thus joint profits remain super-modular under double-sided moral hazard.¥
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